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INTRODUCTION

Prior to the Manhattan Project, the world's first test of an atomic
explosion, significant uncertainty existed among scientists regarding
*This note is dedicated to Dr. O.L. Walker and Dr. Eric Rust.
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the possible consequences of an atomic explosion., Some physicists
who worked on the project believed a reasonable possibility existed
that the chain reaction initiated by splitting a hydrogen atom would
not stop, thus shattering every atom of the planet.2 The wagers they
made among themselves before the test explosion may be viewed as
the beginning of risk assessment as applied to new technologies characterized by a low probability, but catastrophic gravity of harm.
An analogous situation arose following Herbert Boyer's, Stanley
Cohen's, and Paul Berg~s initial discoveries in 1971-723 of methods for
recombinant DNA. 4 Unlike the Manhattan Project wagers, however,
the debate over the potential dangers posed by Boyer's discovery
became a matter of open scientific and then public debate. 5 Because
Berg's and Boyer's initial proposals involved the replication of viruses
linked to cancer, some scientists warned that the engineered virus
might replicate uncontrollably.6 Since the proposed host organism was

1.

D. HAWKINS, R.

SMITH,

E. TRUSLOW, PROJECT Y, THE Los ALAMOS STORY 352

(1983).
2. Id.
3. Krimsky, Gene Splicing Enters the Environment: The Socio-Historical Context of the
Debate Over Deliberate Release, in APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 27 (J. Fowle ed. 1987)
(describing Boyer's and Cohen's work); Barkstrom, Recombinant DNA and the Regulation of
Biotechnology: Reflections on the Asilomar Conference, Ten Years After, 19 AKRON L. REV.
81, 83 (1985) (describing Berg's work).
4. Recombinant DNA refers to the deliberate alteration of an organism's fundamental
genetic material, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), by combining segments of DNA from more than
one organism to produce new genetic characteristics in the new organism. Post, Laying the
Groundwork: The Techniques and Applications of Recombinant DNA Technology, in Biotechnology and the Environment: The Regulation of Genetically Engineered Organisms Used in the
Environment, Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Conference on the Environment May 6-7,
1988, 1989 A.B.A. STANDING COMMiTTEE ON ENVTL. L. 3, 4.
5. Barkstrom, supra note 3, at 85-87.
6. Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights Responsibilities: A History of
the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1021-22 (1978). Robert
Pollack reacted with alarm to Berg's proposal:
[I] had a fit. SV40 is a small animal tumor virus; in tissue cultures in the lab,
SV40 also transforms individual human cells, making them look very like tumor
cells. And bacteriophage lambda just naturally lives in E. coli, and E. coli just
naturally lives in people ....
And I said, of all stupid things, at least put it into
a phage, then, that doesn't grow in a bug that grows in your gut! Because what
if the combination escapes from the lab: then you have SV40 replicating in step
with the E. coli and a constant exposure of the cells in your gut to the DNA of
SV40. Which is a route in for the virus that never occurs in nature and therefore
something you might not be prepared to fend off.
Id. at 1021 (emphasis in original). The SV40 tumor virus also was used in recombinant DNA
experiments by Boyer and Berg in 1973 when Boyer's restriction enzyme was demonstrated as
a way of "cleaving" SV40 DNA. Barkstrom, supra note 3, at 84-85.
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a bacterium commonly found in the human intestine, 7 critics cautioned
against the scenario of a cancer epidemic. 8
The scientific debate over Boyer's discovery became public at the
Gordon Research Conference in 1973. 9 As a result, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) created research guidelineslo designed to prevent the accidental release of organisms containing experimental recombinant DNA into the environment." Although the NIH guidelines
are mandatory only for federally funded research,12 most researchers
in the private sector have adopted the guidelines as well. 13
The NIH guidelines have been credited with preventing an unintentional release of recombinant DNA engineered organisms into the
environment. 14 The controversy now, however, centers around intentional releases of genetically altered organisms into the environment.
The controversial aspects of genetic engineering and the rapid
emergence of private corporations seeking commercially to apply it
highlight the need for further regulation of the technology.15 This note
will analyze some of the difficult issues associated with such regulation
as well as evaluate proposed solutions. Section II lists some benefits
and risks of the environmental release of genetically engineered organisms. Section III analyzes problems inherent in science policy decisions when scientific uncertainty complicates risk assessment. Section IV examines the current regulations employed to regulate environmental release of biotechnology. Section V analyzes the serious administrative and regulatory inadequacies of the current federal
framework for these regulations. Finally, section VI evaluates proposed solutions, concluding that new legislation and administrative
procedures will be required to provide adequate environmental protection.

7.
8.

Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, supra note 6, at 1021-22.
Id. at 1021.

9.

Id. at 1020.

10. Id. at 1030-31.
11. Id. at 1036-45.
12. Krimsky, supra note 3, at 28, 29.
13. Id.
14. Biotechnology Science CoordinationAct of 1986: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment and the Subcomm. on Science,
Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 112 (1986) [hereinafter Biotechnology Hearings] (statement of the Hon. Harold Voller,
U.S. Representative, Missouri (Chairman of the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of
the Comm. on Science and Technology)).
15. Id. at 112-18.
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BENEFITS AND RISKS OF RELEASE BIOTECHNOLOGY

A. Benefits
One of the primary beneficiaries of release biotechnology is the
agricultural industry.16 Genetic alteration of crops can add or subtract
features such as frost or drought resistance, thereby enabling crops
to adapt to varying climatic conditions. 17 For example, frost-sensitive
crops or plants act as host to a bacterium whose regularity of structure
enables ice crystals to form at freezing temperatures.18 Elimination of
a single gene in this bacterium changes the regularity of its structure,
inhibiting ice crystal formation and preventing ice damage at temperatures substantially below 32 0 F. Microbiologists also can design crops
that resist pests, disease, or herbicides. 19 Genetic manipulations can
program crops to produce substances toxic to insects that feed on
them. 20 Genetic alterations also can produce more rapid growth and
greater size in crops and animals.21
Release biotechnology has applications outside the agricultural
arena as well. For instance, microbiologists have engineered bacteria
capable of separating minerals from the impurities in ore.2 Microbiologists also have engineered bacteria to break down and consume

oil spills.2 Even recreational uses for genetically spliced bacteria have
been conceived, such as preventing snow from melting on ski slopes.B.

Risks

Such innovative possibilities create risks as well as benefits. Scientists hotly debate the probability and magnitude of harm entailed in
these risks. On the whole, microbiologists are far more optimistic than
ecologists about the relative harmlessness of genetically engineered
organisms released into the environment.2 Those microbiologists who
16. Pimentel, Genetic Engineering, Agriculture, and Environmental Policy, 17 POL'Y
STUD. J. 117 (1988).
17. Pendorf, Regulating the Environmental Release of Genetically Engineered Organisms:
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 891, 903-05 (1985).
18. Pimentel, supra note 16, at 117.
19. Pendorf, supra note 17, at 903-05.
20. Hoffman, The Biotechnology Revolution and Its Regulatory Evolution, 38 DRAKE L.
REV. 475 (1988-89).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 475-76.

23.

Harlow, The EPA and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping with Scientific Uncertainty,

95 YALE L.J. 553, 554 (1986).
24. Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1986, at D6, col. 3.

25. CoordinatedFrameworkforRegulation of Biotechnology: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Investigationsand Oversight and the Subcomm. on NaturalResources, AgricultureResearch,
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advocate the safety of biotechnology emphasize the analogy between
recombinant DNA techniques and traditional plant and animal crossbreeding practices.26 This line of argument maintains that genetic engineering simply increases the efficiency of what plant and animal
breeders have done for centuries. Accordingly, many microbiologists
view genetic engineering as no more inherently dangerous than conventional methods of creating hybrid species. Ecologists, however,
focus on the unintended and unknown environmental consequences
that frequently result from the introduction of new species into ecosystems in which they replicate uncontrollably or eliminate native species,
regardless of the methods of production.Y
Microbiologists tend to view genetically engineered organisms not
as exotic species but as extensions of domesticated and cross-bred
organisms. They note that genetically engineered organisms differ
from the native stock only in one or two carefully chosen characteristics.2 Microbiologists argue that genetically engineered species actually bear a competitive disadvantage, since native organisms, through
evolution, have adapted optimally to their environments. On the basis
of this theory, microbiologists conclude that since genetically modified
organisms are not as well adapted to their environments as non-en
gineered organisms, they are therefore less likely to survive in the
natural environment, much less threaten their unaltered competitors.
Ecologists, in contrast, generally emphasize the analogy between
genetically altered organisms and non-native, exotic species imported
into new environments. They note that "[a]dditions of non-indigenous
organisms can influence the structure (population size and species
diversity) and function (energy and material dynamics) of ecological
communities through a variety of mechanisms that sometimes displace
or destroy indigenous species.'5' 0 Ecologists point to the disastrous
environmental effects of such non-native species as kudzu, starlings,
carp, and Dutch elm disease as examples of what can result from
introducing non-indigenous species into an ecosystemA1 Rather than

andEnvironment and the Subcomm. on Science, Researchand Technology of the House Comm.
on Science Technology, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 74-75 (1986) [hereinafter Framework].
26. Thompson, Agriculture, Biotechnology, and the PoliticalEvaluationof Risk, 17 PoL'Y
STUD. J. 97, 100-01 (1988).

27. Id.
28. Lynn, Poteat & Palmer, The Interplay of Science, Technology, and Values in Environmental Applications of Biotechnology, 17 POLr STUD. J. 109, 110 (1988).
29. Id. The addition of genes that provide the altered organism with new functions therefore

might require it to use more energy and reduce its fitness for survival. Id.
30. Sharples, Regulation of Productsfrom Biotechnology, 235 ScI. 1329 (1987).
31. Id. at 1329, 1330 n.1.
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inherently weakening an organism's ability to survive in its environment, some genetic alterations improve the ability of organisms to
2
survive, reproduce, compete for resources, or invade new habitats.
Ecologists also fear that altered organisms might transfer their engineered characteristics to an unintended host, either through natural
cross-breeding among related species or horizontally among unrelated
species by vectors such as bacteria.Another point of contention between microbiologists and ecologists
involves the alleged "harmlessness" of native plants, animals, and
microbes. Proponents of genetic alteration argue that because most
native organisms function beneficially in the environment, genetically
altered native organisms pose no environmental hazard.3 Ecologists,
however, cite examples in which even unaltered native plants, animals,
and microorganisms have changed from their natural environmental
niches to become serious weeds, pests, and pathogens to introduced
crops. 35 Moreover, ecologists challenge the microbiologists' facile assumption that the safety of native plants or animals can be compared
to the safety of bacteria, since so little is known about bacterial ecol36
ogy.

32. Id.
33. Lynn, Poteat & Palmer, supra note 28, at 111. Greenhouse tests showed that tobacco
plant bacteria into which an insect toxin was genetically encoded showed that the bacteria could
be transferred by farm tools to nuisance plants that are controlled naturally by caterpillars. If
the altered bacteria, now resistant to caterpillars, were transferred to the nuisance plants, these
undesirable plants would then be resistant to the caterpillars as well, enabling them to proliferate.
Id.; see also Krimsky, Evidence for Toxin Gene Transfer During Field Tests, 5 GENEWATCH
6 (1989).
34. See Pimentel, supra note 16, at 119.
35. Id. Approximately 125 species of introduced domesticated plants have become serious
weed pests, including water hyacinth, Johnson grass, goatsrue, reed canarygrass, veronic, and
lantana. Introduced livestock including goats and pigs have become pests themselves. Id.; see
also Sharpies, supra note 30, at 1331 (release of domestic cats has resulted through predation
in the extinction of over 30 species of other animals).
36. See Sharpies, supra note 30, at 1331. Professor Sharples discussed the limited knowledge
available about bacterial ecology:
Among bacteria, probably only two or three taxa . . . have been studied well
enough to qualify for the "domesticated" label . . . . It is not uncommon these
days for genetic engineering efforts to begin on bacterial species that have only
just been described and even before their basic physiological properties have been
determined . . . . Knowledge of the biotic and abiotic interactions of most species
in mixed populations in natural ecological systems is extremely limited. Currently
the unknowns far outweigh the knowns where the ecological properties of microbes
are concerned.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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III.

THE PROBLEMS OF UNCERTAINTY, FACTS, AND VALUES

A.

Scientific Uncertainty and Trans-Scientific Issues

The debate among scientists about the risks of harm from environmental release of genetically engineered organisms reveals a major
problem with any attempt to regulate their release: scientific uncertainty. Joel Yellin, Senior Research Scientist at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, carefully demonstrates that, since the New
Deal, the federal government has relied heavily on expert opinion to
design regulations for complex phenomena.3 7 These experts establish
the factual parameters for policy choices and the ultimate implementation of regulation. When disagreement becomes widespread among
experts who rely on divergent theoretical assumptions, however, fundamental scientific uncertainty prevails both at the theoretical and
experimental level. The New Deal legacy of regulation based on "facts"
established by experts breaks down when significant scientific uncertainty exists.3 A careful analysis of sources and types of scientific
uncertainty in the regulatory context may help adjust the New Deal
model to account for such situations.
The New Deal model assumes that facts can be separated clearly
from value choices or political decisions 9 In this scenario, experts politically disinterested scientists - are supposed simply to provide
objective scientific facts. In light of this set of scientific facts, political
actors make informed policy decisions based on an accurate picture of
reality rather than armchair speculation.
Alvin Weinberg pointed out the fallacy of this model by discussing
the large gray area between pure science and pure policy. 40 In this
gray area scientific judgment and political choice coexist in such a
way that they become almost indistinguishable. Weinberg calls this
coexistence zone "trans-science."'41 He defines it as the arena in which
decisions apparently rely on scientific information and judgment, but
the rationales for these decisions cannot be deduced strictly from scientific principles.42
Many of the issues which arise in the course of the interaction
between science or technology and society ... hang on the

37. Yellin, Science Technology, and Administrative Government: InstitutionalDesigns for
Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE. L.J. 1300, 1301 (1983).
38. Id. at 1305-16.
39. Id. at 1305.
40. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209, 209 (1972).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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answers to questions which can be asked of science and yet
which cannot be answered by science.... [tihough they are
. . . questions of fact and can be stated in the language of
science, they are unanswerable by science; they transcend
4
science. 3
These trans-scientific questions are often a product of scientific
uncertainty. Weinberg acknowledges that in some cases scientific uncertainty is merely a function of the early stage of learning in a field
where further investigation eventually will eliminate uncertainty.4
But more often than not in the regulatory context, decisionmakers
cannot scientifically resolve this uncertainty because definitive experimentation is either impractical or impossible. 45 Questions regarding
the level of pressure a hydroelectric dam can bear before collapsing
and how many years such a structure can endure before it becomes
unsafe exemplify trans-scientific issues. In principle these questions
could have scientific answers, but attaining such certain answers would
require experimental construction and operation of one hundred dams
for a thousand years.
Another example of a trans-scientific issue includes questions about
what level of exposure to potential carcinogens constitutes a harm
that government should regulate.46 Substantial uncertainty exists
about the validity of extrapolations based on data from exposure of
laboratory animals to high-dosage levels of potential carcinogens. 47
This type of uncertainty seems permanent because testing animals
offers the only practical and ethical means of testing. Although all
available scientific data must be brought to bear in determining what
level of human exposure regulators should prohibit, the residual uncertainty means that decisionmakers cannot determine the policy on
purely scientific factual grounds. At this point uncertainty itself becomes an aspect of the factual picture, and the question of what level
of risk is acceptable in light of the uncertainty becomes a question of
value, requiring political determination.
Because of the trans-scientific character of numerous questions
entailed in technology regulation, Yellin deplores continued reliance
on the New Deal model.48 He contends that the distinction between

43.
44.

Id.
Id.

45.

D.

DONIGER, THE LAW AND POLICY OF Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL: A CASE

14 (1978).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 13.
See Yellin, supra note 37, at 1316.

STUDY OF VINYL CHLORIDE

46.
47.
48.
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scientific and legal issues is arbitrary and thus, unworkable. 49 Failure
to recognize the trans-scientific character of such questions too often
lends "scientific" credibility and authority as well as an air of "factuality" to assertions or determinations that are at least as dependent
on value choices as they are on "scientific fact."' The inevitability of
value choices becomes clearest in the risk assessment stage of decisionmaking.
[S]cientists asked to assess risk cannot separate factual determinations from their subjective feelings about the probability of harm and the acceptability of taking risks. As scientists make decisions about what risk possibilities to investigate and what test procedures to employ, they make assumptions that reflect their political and ethical preferences. These
preferences are not explicitly stated along with the risk determinations; thus unknown biases skew risk measurements. 51
B.

Debate Between Microbiologists and Ecologists

The dynamics of trans-scientific questions and acceptable risk
choices underlie much of the debate over the degree of harm posed
by the release of genetically engineered organisms as well as the
necessity and adequacy of current regulation. "Scientific" arguments
between microbiologists, whose confidence in the safety of genetic
engineering leads them to urge minimal regulation,52 and ecologists,
whose fear of unknown and unintended consequences leads them to
urge caution, 53 reflect trans-scientific judgments. Microbiologists emphasize the harmless behavior of altered organisms during small-scale
testing in isolated laboratory or greenhouse environments.54 Ecologists
emphasize that such limited and controlled environments provide an
inadequate basis to predict an altered organism's behavior in complex,
natural environments. In the vastly more complex and unpredictable
natural ecosystem, even subtle changes can render behavior that
seemed harmless in the laboratory harmful in reality.-5

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 1300.
Harlow, supra note 23, at 553, 561 (footnote omitted).
See Framework, supra note 25, at 59.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 74.
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Microbiologists and ecologists choose contrasting models to characterize the behavior of engineered organisms.6 In addition, even when
both sides appeal to the principles of evolution and natural selection,
they apply those principles in divergent ways that lead to opposite
conclusions. 57 Even when both sides agree on basic data, they often
arrive at contrasting views on which policies the data imply.- The
quantity and type of regulation that results depends on which perspective decisionmakers employ to determine what level of risk is acceptable in the face of uncertainty. As with the examples of harmful-dosage
levels of potential carcinogens, substantial uncertainty about the risk
of harm remains, at least until the organisms in question are actually
released into the environment on a broad scale. Unfortunately, if harm
results at that point it may be too late to mitigate irreversible catastrophic damage5 9
C.

Need for a New Model of Trans-Scientific Decisionmaking

Recognition of trans-scientific issues requires a new perspective
on the regulatory decisionmaking process. While this note will not
attempt the complete articulation of a new model, several features
that should characterize a new model for regulatory decisionmaking
have emerged from Yellin's and Weinberg's analyses.- Outside the
purely academic context, decisionmakers can no longer view scientists
as completely objective arbiters of scientific fact in their role as advisors to or participants in governmental regulatory bodies. Scientists'
pronouncements on policy issues cannot be accepted routinely as pure
scientific fact.61 While scientists offer legitimate scientific knowledge
and informed opinions necessary to the process of regulation, they
also must acknowledge explicitly the trans-scientific and value-laden
character of their work. Moreover, decisionmakers must consider this
trans-scientific factor in the regulatory process.
The combination of fact and value in scientists' conclusions are not
entirely separable. Yet both scientists and regulators can make relative
distinctions between factual and value-laden components in their work
and explicitly acknowledge them. Scientists and policymakers must
routinely employ methods of analysis that explicitly state theoretical

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
See Sharples, supra note 30, at 1330.
Davis, BacterialDomestication: UnderlyingAssumptions, 235 ScI. 1329, 1334-35 (1987).
See Sharples, supra note 30, at 1331.
See supra notes 3749 and accompanying text.
See Harlow, supra note 23, at 561.
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and methodological assumptions to prevent unknown biases from skewing risk measurements. e Analysis must also clarify and explain the
value orientations implicit in any position taken on the crucial questions
involved.6 Finally, scientists must acknowledge explicit alternatives
to the chosen theoretical, methodological, and value assumptions. Such
crucial assumptions must be available not only for the critical scrutiny
of other experts, but for political actors making informed risk decisions
and the public at large.A
IV.

FEDERAL REGULATION OF RELEASE BIOTECHNOLOGY

A. Administrative Framework
Prior to 1984, the National Institutes of Health Guidelines were
the primary means for regulating the accidental release of genetically
engineered organisms into the environment.6 The limitations of these
guidelines, however, precipitated a call for greater regulation.6 In
particular, anticipation of rapid growth in the commercial application
of release biotechnology magnified the need for improved regulation.
In 1986 the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
published the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology.6 The Coordinated Framework purports to provide a coherent
process by which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and
the National Science Foundation (NSF) can regulate release
biotechnology through existing legislation2 The Coordinated
Framework requires each agency to maintain a scientific advisory
committee to screen biotechnology methods and products on a case-bycase basis. 69 The intended use of the product in question determines
which agency will have jurisdiction over it.7° When an overlap in juris-

62. Id.
63. Id. at 563.
64. Id.
65. See Biotechnology Hearings, supra note 14, at 112.
66. Id. at 112-13.
67. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302
(1986).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 23,305, 23,306.
70. Id. at 23,304-05. Genetically altered food products and drugs are regulated by the FDA;
pesticides and nonagricultural products by the EPA; and plant pests, animal biologics, and other
agricultural products by the USDA. Id. at 23,304.
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diction occurs, one agency may defer to another's regulations or a
primary agency may be designated by mutual consent. 71
In the same year the Reagan Administration chartered the
Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee (BSCC) to coordinate
the policies of the agencies with regulatory responsibility for
biotechnology.72 The BSCC has no regulatory or review authority.-h
It merely provides interagency communication of scientific information, review procedures, and risk assessment methods.7 4
13.

USDA Regulations

Among the several agencies that regulate biotechnology, the USDA
and the EPA are the primary agencies responsible for regulating release of genetically engineered organisms into the environment. The
USDA derives its jurisdiction of release biotechnology from the Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA)75 and the Plant Quarantine Act (PQA).76
The FPPA grants the Secretary of Agriculture authority to regulate
importation and interstate transportation of plant pests. 77 The USDA
contends that this jurisdiction extends to the environmental release
of genetically engineered organisms classified as plant pests.78 The
FPPA allows the USDA to seize or quarantine exotic plant pests once
they determine a hazard exists.79 Because the use of plant pathogens
to transfer genes to plants is increasing, regulations further require
that any person intending to release, import, or move across state
lines any genetically engineered plant pathogen must have a permit
from USDA.8O The USDA maintains a list of plant pathogens, s ' which
determines whether a particular organism or vector agent is subject
to regulation.

71.
72.

Id. at 23,305.
Establishment of the Biotechnology Science Advisory Committee, 51 Fed. Reg. 24,221

(1986).
73. Id.
74. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology; Establishment of the
Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,174, 47,176 (1985).
75. 7 U.S.C. §§ 150 aa-jj (J982).
76. Id. §§ 151-64, 166-67.
77. Id. § 150 bb.
78. See Final Policy Statement for Research and Regulation of Biotechnology Processes
and Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,336, 23,346 (1986).
79. 7 U.S.C. § 150 dd(a) (1982).
80. 7 C.F.R. § 340.0, 340.1 (1987).
81. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,362-63 (1986).
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C. EPA Regulations
The EPA regulates nonagricultural uses of release biotechnology
under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)Y8 TSCA requires a
Premanufacture Notification (PMN) 83 to the EPA ninety days prior
to commercial production of "new" chemical substances 4 The EPA
interprets "new" chemical substances to include any microorganism
that contains genetic material from a genera other than its own (intergeneric). Since some potentially harmful microorganisms fall outside the intergeneric definition of new microorganisms,8 the EPA also
utilizes "significant new use rules" (SNURs)87 to monitor new uses of
genetically altered organisms as well as new microorganisms A5 The
EPA also employs SNURs to monitor altered microorganisms comprised of genetic material from the same genera (intrageneric) as well,
especially when either the donor or the host is a pathogen.
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA),89 the EPA also regulates genetically engineered organisms
used as pesticides. Because the EPA deems some microorganisms to
pose less risk than others, FIFRA provides two levels of review.
Level I review, 9° the less stringent of the two, applies to microbial
pesticides engineered from a single genera and containing no diseasecausing microbe. This less stringent review is also used for "native"
(indigenous) microbeso9 whether or not they are disease-causing
(pathogenic)Y8 Non-disease-causing, non-native microbes also are subject to Level I scrutiny. FIFRA requires a Level II inquiry 93 for

82. Statement of Policy; Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substance Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313, 23,315 (1986)
[hereinafter Statement of Policy].
83. Id. at 23,325.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A) (1982). A chemical substance is defined as "any organic or
inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity, including... any combination of such
substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical reaction or occurring in nature
.."Id.
85. Statement of Policy, supra note 82, at 23,325.
86. Korwek, Towards Understanding the United States Biotechnology Regulatory
Framework, 24 BIOTECHNOLOGY: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL POLICIES AND REGULATIONS 24 (1988).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1)(B) (1982).
88. Id.
89. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982).
90. Statement of Policy, supra note 82, at 23,321.
91. Id.
92. Id.

93. Id. at 23,322.
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intergeneric microorganisms, microbial pathogens, and genetically-engineered, 94 non-indigenous pathogens. EPA review under FIFRA does
not preclude independent USDA review if pathogens are involved. 95
Under Level I review, the EPA has thirty days to notify the
producer as to whether it will require an experimental use permit
(EUP) for field tests entailing environmental release of genetically
altered organisms.9 The EPA has ninety days under Level II review
97
to determine whether it will require an EUP
V.

PROBLEMS WITH THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK

A.

Statutes Not Designed for Biotechnology

In spite of the recent attempt at interagency coordination, the
current mechanisms remain unwieldy. The present patchwork of statutes and agencies originally were not designed to regulate biotechnology.- Stretching these statutes to include potentially hazardous microbes under the term "chemical substance" in order to achieve TSCA
jurisdiction9 demonstrates the makeshift way in which genetically altered release biotechnology has been regulated. For example, a ninetyday PMN may be adequate notice for the evaluation of a potentially
hazardous chemical because adequate data exists for comparative assessment. However, in the case of genetically engineered organisms,'0 °
adequate data does not exist. Thus, ninety days is not a reasonable
deadline. l0l
In addition, the ability of genetically altered organisms to replicate
and evolve makes them more dangerous than chemicals. °0 The effects

94. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,884-85 (1984).
95. See Korwek, supra note 86, at 22.
96. Statement of Policy, supra note 82, at 23,321 (EPA will require an EUP if a preliminary
assessment determines that additional information or monitoring is warranted).
97. Id. at 23,322 (the 90 days begin to run once the supporting data have been submitted).
98. See Framework, supra note 25, at 46-48.
99. Statement of Policy, supra note 82, at 23,324.
100. See Harlow, supra note 23, at 565.
101. Id.
102. See Sharples, supra note 30, at 1331. Sharples explained the difference between hazardous chemicals and genetically engineered organisms as follows:
To state that the scale of an introduction or application is only important for
chemicals, but not for organisms, is absurd. Chemicals are invariably diluted, and
are often degraded, as they disperse ....

A population of release organisms that

finds itself in a suitable environmental setting, however, may reproduce, evolve,
and transfer genetic material to other organisms in the environment. Mistakes,
therefore, can have permanent consequences.
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of replication, mutation, and evolution are unpredictable and possibly
even irreversible. Unlike hazardous chemicals, for which quantities
can be carefully limited and more easily restricted to certain areas,
the ability of genetically altered microbes to replicate makes control
over their quantity and spread exceedingly difficult and complex. The
EPA designed TSCA regulations to cover hazardous chemicals, not
genetically altered microbes. Moreover, critics assert that EPA regu1
lations are inadequate even for regulating the use of chemicals. 03
These regulations are far less adequate to monitor the more complex
and subtle interactions of living organisms in environmental systems.104
The USDA's regulation of biotechnology by means of the Plant
Pest Act (PPA) provides another example of conventional regulations
not designed for and not adequate for biotechnology regulation.105 The
PPA applies only to those organisms categorized as "plant pests."
Therefore, the PPA does not cover either organisms beneficial to
plants or nonparasitic plants, which comprise most of the plant world.10
Nor does the PPA cover vertebrate animals.107 Genetically engineered
organisms from major segments of the biological spectrum thus remain
unregulated, even though they may still pose a threat to the environment.
B.

Commercial and Non-Commercial Research

Currently, the EPA interprets the TSCA to apply to commercial
°
research involving the release of genetically engineered organisms.1 s
Noncommercial experiments involving such direct releases are exempt
from regulation. °9 The distinction between commercial and noncommercial research, however, is problematic.110 First, private industry
sponsors sixteen to twenty-four percent of university biotechnology
research.,' In addition, whether research qualifies as commercial or
103. See Issues in the Federal Regulation of Biotechnology: From Research to Release,
Report Prepared by the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight Transmitted to the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1986) [hereinafter Biotechnology

Report].
104. See Sharples, supra note 30, at 1331-32.
105. Fogleman, Regulating Science: An Evaluation of the Regulation of Biotechnology
Research, 17 ENVTL. L. 183, 245 (1987).
106. See Framework, supra note 25, at 47.
107. Id.
108. See Toxic Substances: Revisions of Premanufacture Notification Regulations, Final
Rule, 40 C.F.R. pt.720 (1986).
109. Statement of Policy, supra note 82, at 23,331 (noncommercial experiments are exempt

by TSCA § 5(g)).
110.
111.

See Fogleman, supra note 105, at 257.
Id.
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noncommercial depends on the intent of the researcher. 112 This subjective standard makes it virtually impossible to divine the actual intent
of researchers claiming to conduct basic noncommercial research, who
later "discover" commercial applications.113 A subjective-intent-based
standard, therefore, cannot meaningfully be enforced.
The attempt to distinguish between noncommercial and commercial
research also overlooks the fact that TSCA was meant to exempt basic
research, whether by noncommercial or commercial researchers. 114 Yet
neither Congress's intent to exempt basic research nor EPA's attempt
to regulate research with commercial ends addresses the real problem.
Environmental safety requires regulation of all research regardless of
the organizational setting or the intended application. A genetically
engineered hazardous organism causes no less damage when released
into the environment merely because the person who released it was
engaged in noncommercial research.
C.

Burden of Proof

The coordinated framework creates another problem by placing
the burden of proof of harm on the EPA. The EPA must demonstrate
a significant risk of environmental harm in order to prohibit environmental release of genetically altered organisms.115 FDA legislation by
contrast places the burden of proof on the manufacturer of a product
to prove the product's safety.16 Given the lack of adequate data and
the fundamental uncertainty surrounding release biotechnology, placing the burden of proof of harm on the EPA effectively favors agency
approval of genetically altered organisms about which little or nothing
is known. Uncertainty about the biological product's potential harm
prevents the EPA from meeting its burden of proof. In contrast, the
manufacturer has to prove nothing at all in order to proceed with
environmental release. Therefore, the manufacturer enjoys a presumption of safety. This presumption offers no incentive for the manufacturer to resolve uncertainty through further research. In fact, a presumption of safety actually may provide a disincentive on the manufacturer's part to dispel the uncertainty, since additional research may

Id. at 257 n.388.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(3) (1982).
See Biotechnology Report, supra note 103, at 86.
See Ostrach, Biotechnology and the FDA Review Process, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL POLICIES AND REGULATIONS 107 (1988).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
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provide evidence of harm that the manufacturer would rather not
7
confront.1
D.

Examples of Regulatory Failure

A number of incidents further illustrate the regulatory problems.
For example, a private agricultural company, Agracetus, applied to
the National Institutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee 18 (NIH-RAG) for approval to conduct a field test of a genetically
engineered tobacco plant."9 Although the NIH approved the application, a subsequent court decision'20 enjoined the field test because NIH
had approved the test without doing the environmental assessment
121
required by the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA).
Agracetus then turned to the USDA for permission to field test the
plant.m2 The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), a
division of USDA, ruled that since the engineered tobacco plant did
not qualify as a plant pestm under the Federal Plant Pest Act, the
field test did not pose a danger."2 Agracetus then returned to the
NIH-RAC, which subsequently approved the field test of the plant.25

117. This fear of unknown harm kept asbestos manufacturers from investigating the seemingly obvious health hazards confronted by asbestos workers on a daily basis. See Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-86, 1093 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974); see generally Broder, The Asbestos Industry on Trial, THE NEW YORKER,
June 10, 1985, at 49.
118. See Fogleman, supra note 105, at 205. The NIH-RAC is the organization with the
most experience in regulating biotechnology. Yet a significant portion of this regulation has
been of academic researchers operating in contained laboratory facilities. Id. at 207.
119. See Biotechnology Hearings, supra note 14, at 112.
120. Id.
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982). NEPA requires all federal agencies to assess formally
the environmental impact of any major federal action that will affect significantly the quality
of the human environment. The report must include:
1) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented.
3) alternatives to the proposed action,
4) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id. § 4332(2)(C).
122. See Biotechnology Hearings, supra note 14, at 113.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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When another company, Calgene, submitted a similar proposal to the
USDA to field test a different type of genetically engineered tobacco
plant,126 the Agricultural Recombinant DNA Research Committee of
the USDA reviewed the application rather than APHIS. 1- This illustrates both the interagency and the intra-agency confusion over regulatory procedures.
In November 1985, the EPA approved a proposal by Advanced
Genetic Sciences, Inc. (AGS) to field test genetically engineered bacteria,' 2 ice-minus, designed to prevent frost formation on strawberry
plants.'1 In a congressional hearing one month after EPA approval,
the EPA cited its procedures in the AGS application as an example
of the EPA's ability to protect the public without causing undue delay
to the growth of biotechnology companies.130 In the same hearing,
USDA officials also asserted that they corrected the intra-agency coordination problem manifested in the Agracetus and Calgene applications.13 ' Congressman Volkmer characterized the testimony of EPA
and USDA as creating "a picture of regulatory certainty and thorough3 2

ness."1

Four months later, however, the same congressional subcommittee
learned that AGS had implemented unauthorized tests of ice-minus
bacteria in trees planted on the open rooftop of its offices in Oakland,
California.'13 These tests generated data under uncontrolled conditions,
in contradiction to the AGS application to EPA. Accordingly, the tests
produced questionable results.'3 At a subsequent hearing'3 more
troubling facts emerged. AGS defended its rooftop tests by claiming
that the rooftop trees constituted a "contained facility,' ' 36 which therefore did not require EPA approval. 37 This is hardly what the NIH

126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.

129. Id.
130. Id. at 113-14. See Oehsen, Regulating Genetic Engineering in an Era of Increased
Judicial Deference: A ProperBalance of Federal Powers, 40 ADMINISTRATIVE L. REV. 309-10
(1988) (when a University of California researcher founded Genentech, a small venture capital
company, the initial public offering set a Wall Street record, selling all one million shares at a
value climbing from $35 to $89 in only 20 minutes).
131. Biotechnology Hearings, supra note 14, at 114.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Biotechnology Report, supra note 103, at 31.
137.

Id.
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Guidelines envisioned by the term contained facility.'3 In addition,
the subcommittee learned that one "remote" field test site proposed
by AGS was the backyard of an AGS official who lived in a residential
neighborhood. The EPA had failed to visit the site to assess its appropriateness. 39
One month after the second AGS hearing, the subcommittee
learned that the USDA approved a genetically engineered live virus
pseudo-rabies vaccine 140 for pigs'4 ' without the required approval by
the USDA's Agricultural Recombinant DNA Research Committee
(ARRC).'4 In addition, the subcommittee learned that the inventor
of the vaccine had violated NIH-RAC guidelines by field testing 1,400
pigs without notifying the institutional biosafety committees'43 of either
Baylor College of Medicine or Texas A. & M. University.'- Testimony
further revealed that the USDA failed to classify the vaccine as a
recombinant organism until after the corporate applicant had field
tested the vaccine in several Midwestern states. 45 In contrast to its
prior testimony, 146 following the late classification of the vaccine as a
recombinant organism, the USDA neither submitted the license application to the ARRC for review nor published an environmental assessment of the projected effects of releasing the vaccine.'4 Like AGS,
the vaccine inventor defended his action by claiming that inoculation
of pigs outside a contained laboratory did not constitute an environmental release. 14'

138.

See id. When asked by the investigating congressional subcommittee whether EPA

guidelines were clear with respect to the meaning of "contained facility," Mr. Steven Schatzow,
Director of the EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs, replied:
If you or I were asked when you read something in sequence that talks about
laboratory, contained laboratory, growth chamber, greenhouse, or other contained

facility, if you were taking your Miller analogy test and someone then said tree,
...does that go in the same group, you or I would probably say I don't think so.
Id.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 38.
Biotechnology Hearings, supra note 14, at 115.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 115.

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.

147. Id.
148.

See Biotechnology Report, supra note 103, at 38.
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Inadequate Definitions and Stringency of Review

Where two regulatory agencies overlap - for example the EPA
49
and the USDA in the regulation of pathogenic microorganisms1 differing burdens of proof, criteria of review, or definitions of crucial
terms like "environmental release150 are likely to result in "agency
shopping" for the most favorable regulatory process. 151 One of the
Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee's (BSCC) purposes is
to prevent agency shopping by promoting interagency coordination. 152
The BSCC has no authority, however, to impose uniformity throughout
the several agencies.10 It also has no authority to regulate, yet its
"scientific" definitions of such terms as "engineered organisms" and
"environmental release" are tantamount to regulation. '- Such determinations, made behind closed doors, are examples of "science policy"
made in the guise of science and may be an improper exercise of
authority. 155
Review procedures within the Coordinated Framework create additional concerns. For example, even when genetically engineered organisms fall within the PPA category of plant pests, the review process
is not adequate to assure environmental safety. 156 The USDA estimates
that the information required to secure a permit under the PPA will
cost only $5,000 to prepare and will not require generation of any new
data. 157 The permit merely requires descriptive data, country of origin,
and planned quantity of introduction.I- Given the uncertainty about
the environmental impact of genetically engineered organisms, Dr.
Margaret Mellon, molecular virologist and attorney with the Environmental Law Institute,159 concludes, "It is scientifically impossible to
understand how [the] USDA could make an assessment of ecological
hazard without ever requiring additional case-specific data."','
The rationale recognizing categories subject to less stringent review is problematic. For instance, the EPA's regulations focus strictest

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See Korwek, supra note 86, at 25.
See Biotechnology Report, supra note 103, at 77.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 80.
Hoffman, supra note 20, at 546.
Id.
Id.
Framework, supra note 25, at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 48.
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review on organisms with intergeneric sources of recombinant DNA. 161
The assumption is that combinations nonexistent in nature are more
likely adversely to affect the environment.'6 Therefore, genetic engineering methods that merely recombine or delete certain genes's
within a single organism'6 or genera are subject to less stringent
review.'6 This overlooks the possibility that, regardless of which
method is employed, alteration of an organism may result in unanticipated characteristics that alter the organism's functions in ways that
harm the environment.'0
The current regulatory framework exempts from rigorous review
those organisms that are nonpathogenic or intrageneric.167 This scheme
is based on the assumption that genetically engineered organisms with
genetic material from more than one genera (intergeneric) pose substantially greater risk of environmental harm' s than organisms genetically engineered from genetic material within the same genera (intrageneric). 69 Ecologists are leery of relying on the intergeneric-intrageneric criterion to distinguish potentially harmful organisms from
harmless ones.170 Criticizing the adequacy of intergeneric-intrageneric
distinction, Dr. Elliott A. Norse, Ph.D, Director of Public Affairs for
the Ecological Society of America,'1 concludes that the
intergeneric criterion... reflect[s] inadequate understanding
of the variation among species in a genus. These differences
can be crucial to us .

. .

. Most species of sumac trees in

the genus Rhus are quite harmless to people, but poison
sumac is not. Potatoes and eggplants are important food
plants in the genus Solanum, but you would do well to avoid
eating the Solanum called deadly nightshade. Many species
of Anopheles mosquitoes cannot host malarial parasites, but
those that do carry the world's worst infectious disease.
Many species of Bacillus bacteria are harmless to humans
and livestock, but one of them causes deadly anthrax.172
161.
162.
163.

Statement of Policy, supra note 82, at 23,322.
See Sharples, supra note 30, at 1331.
See Framework, supra note 25, at 76.

164. Id.
165.

Statement of Policy, supra note 82, at 23,329.

166. See Framework, supra note 25, at 76.
167. See id. at 75.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 74.
172. Id. at 80. Norse asserted that taxonomic classifications are an unreliable guide to
similarity or dissimilarity among organisms, stating:
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The current regulatory framework also exempts from stringent
review 173 intergeneric hybrid organisms whose genetic changes include
only DNA-regulatory sequences 7' 4 but no new DNA-coding sequences. 5 This exemption reflects the assumption that noncoding regulatory sequences do not affect the gene product, and, therefore, will
not cause environmental harm.176 Regulatory sequences do not affect
the gene product. However, they can greatly multiply the behavior
of the associated gene.1 77 Regulatory sequences also are capable of
changing the signals in genes that turn them "on" and "off."17s These
major quantitative changes in the organism's behavior can produce
79
qualitative changes in the environment.
Limiting the greater stringency of review only to pathogens' also
results in problems. Evaluating organisms' potential danger according
to their pathogenicity overlooks other significant environmental interactions such as predation, parasitism, competition,
and
mutualism.11 A species eliminated by an altered organism that be-

Taxonomists have varying ideas of what constitute a species, genus, or higher
taxon. Those working on mammals on the one hand and bacteria on the other see
things very differently. Taxonomists consider, for example, chimpanzees and people
to be so different that they put them not only in different genera but in different
families. Yet 99 percent of the genes of chimpanzees are the same as ours. I suspect
that chimps and people differ genetically much less than different species within
bacterial genera such as Pseudomonas, Bacillus, and Clostridium.
Id.
173. See Biotechnology Report, supra note 103, at 90.
174. Id.
175. C. FOWLER, E. LACHKOVICS, P. MOONEY & H. SHAND, THE LAWS OF LIFE 303
(1988).
176. See Framework, supra note 25, at 76. Norse contended:
Altering regulatory sequences and deleting genes can affect an organism's survival,
reproduction, and have environmental effects. The rationale for exempting these
alterations is that if no sequences coding for proteins are modified, changes will
be merely quantitative, and hence, minor.
Imagine, however, altering the genetic sequences of a housecat that governed
the rate of production of growth hormone so that you obtain a puma-size kitty.
Those who consider this farfetched should recall that genetic engineers have already
produced mice that are as large as rats. Anyone should understand that an organism
as different as normal- and puma-size cats would differ not only quantitatively but
qualitatively in their effects on the environment.

Id.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 60.
Id.
Id. at 76.
Id.
Id.
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comes a competitor, a predator, or a parasite is just as extinct as one
eliminated by a pathogen. 182
VI.

EVALUATION OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Representatives of the biotechnology industry generally regard the
current regulatory framework as adequate to protect the environment.1 Critics assail the framework as riddled with gaps 1 4 and
plagued by the confusion over intra-agency and interagency jurisdiction.,, Critics contend that definitions of crucial terms within the
regulations are vague and ambiguous. They further argue that current regulations are neither adequately drafted for stringent review
nor adequately supported by reliable data and risk-assessment
7
methods. 's
A.

A Revised Tort System

Proposed solutions vary widely. One commentator, citing the inadequacies of the current regulatory framework, argues that "direct
government regulation cannot adequately protect the public from the
hazards of genetic engineering."' t' The author argues that only a reformed tort system that relies on the market to generate the necessary
scientific data, to allocate risk, and to profit from decentralized decisionmaking can protect the public and the environment effectively. 189
The author suggests three modifications of the tort system for cases
involving genetic engineering. First, the system should use rebuttable
presumptions, with liability proportioned according to probability of
causation. This proposal eases plaintiffs' burdens in proving causation.
Second, the system should impose mandatory financial responsibility.
For instance, firms that propose to release genetically altered organisms into the environment must acquire liability insurance. Finally,
the author recommends joint and several strict liability for defendant
190
firms.
182. Id.
183. See Framework, supra note 25, at 155, 158.
184. See Fogleman, supra note 105, at 235.
185. Id.
186. See Biotechnology Report, supra note 103, at 90.
187. See Framework, supra note 25, at 90.
188. Note, Designer Genes That Dom't Fit: A Tort Regime for Commercial Release of
Genetic Engineering Products, 100 HARv.L. REV. 1086 (1987) (arguing that the administrative
regulation on a case-by-case method currently utilized by federal agencies is expensive and
inefficient).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1096.
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Other commentators, however, reject the adequacy of the tort
system as a means of protecting the environment.191 They stress that
a biotechnology corporation does not have sufficient market incentives
to prevent the risks of environmental harm.- Many of the firms involved in the incipient stages of this industry are small, new, and
under pressure to recover their investments. 193 A number have failed,
and others inevitably will follow in the anticipated intense competition. 19 The increased financial burden may pressure companies to cut
corners or to minimize risk assessment. 95 Many of these companies
are judgment proof.'9 Although some small companies receive financial
assistance from older, more established firms, often they enter agreements that shield the established firms from deep-pocket liability.,Even if the tort system were modified to ease proof of causation,
overall deterrence would still depend upon compensatory and punitive
damage awards. These damage awards would not deter precariously
financed, judgment-proof firms. Similarly, mandatory liability insurance would not serve as an adequate deterrent because "the availability
of insurance blunts the incentive created by the threat of tort liability.,"198.
Even under ideal circumstances a modified tort system still cannot
prevent the irreversible and catastrophic harm that could result from
an environmental release of genetically engineered organisms. 19 Prerelease review by federal agencies remains necessary to prevent the
potential for harm. 200 In spite of these problems, however, the potential
for the tort system to provide significant deterrence and substantial
damage mitigation as a complement to federal agency review should
not be dismissed entirely.
Inevitably, accidents within the biotechnology industry will occur
despite regulation. Companies that comply with the regulatory process
nevertheless will fail to use due care, resulting in environmental damage. The threat of litigation, bad publicity, and substantial liability
can enhance the deterrent effect of the civil and criminal penalties 20

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See Harlow, supra note 23, at 559.
Id. at 559-60 n.33.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 556-57.
Id.
Id. at 559-60 n.33.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (1982).
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at the disposal of the federal regulatory agencies. Mandatory liability
insurance also can help to compensate for damages in instances where
the harm is significant but not catastrophic and irreversible. This
limited-damages scenario is more probable than a biological
holocaust.m
B.

Data and Policy Considerationsfor Risk Assessment

Ultimately, a new federal regulatory system must be developed.
The new system not only must generate accurate data, but also must
incorporate the informed democratic policy choices necessary to risk
management.m Both components, scientific data and political value
choices, are crucial to an adequate regulatory framework. Scientific
data alone cannot solve the regulatory dilemmas.204 Even in areas
where significant data exists, value choices inevitably involve science
policy issues. 2°s Moreover, the assumption that all regulatory questions
are due to temporary scientific uncertainty about the effects of environmental release is incorrect.2w Scientific advance, however stunning,
always will be bound by a horizon of uncertainty. Practical limitations
of time, resources, and scale frequently will necessitate reliance upon
limited information for trans-scientific policy questions.m The appropriate course of action cannot be deferred to some mythical policy-neutral aristocracy of scientists.m
On the other hand, regulatory decisions are not purely policy decisions either.m They do not operate in a vacuum of scientific information. Responsible decisions must embody scientific data as well as

202.

See Harlow, supra note 23, at 559.

203.

Ruckleshaus, Risk, Science, and Democracy, in ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOL-

OGY 29 (Spring 1985).

204. Id. at 24.
205. Id. at 28.
206. Id. at 24.
207. See Harlow, supra note 23, at 564.
208. See Yellin, supra note 37, at 1312. Yellin explains:
The integrity of each scientific community depends on the limited use of the results

of discovery to illuminate the intellectual future. Once the process of weighing
evidence is set in the context of a societal decision, however, the direct impact of

the evaluation does not fall only on the scientific community. Claims of right or of
compensation for injury must then be addressed, and these evoke larger purposes:
the objectives of protecting individual rights, assuring fairness, and preserving the
integrity of the legal system ....
[Tjhese are not questions to which technical
experts qua experts ought to speak.
Id.
209.

See Harlow, supra note 23, at 562.
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theoretical interpretation and extrapolation. To this extent the regulatory framework cannot ignore scientific information. Nor can federal
agencies simply use the inevitability of political choices in science
policy to rationalize choosing only those scientists and scientific
theories that support their predetermined policy objectives or predilections.210 An adequate regulatory framework requires input from all
areas of the scientific community, which must be free to pursue scientific inquiry.11 Given the state of uncertainty and internal conflict
within the scientific community, however, political actors ultimately
must make politically responsible decisions based on provisional information and in light of significant uncertainty.212 The following proposals
for changes in the regulatory framework reflect an awareness of this
need for balance in addressing science policy questions.
C.

Quasi-AdversarialDecisionmaking

One proposal designed to compensate for the policy-laden character
of trans-scientific regulatory issues would require a quasi-adversarial
decisionmaking process within the regulatory agency.1 3 The theory is
that a quasi-adversarial process would ensure that the best case, for
either competing scientific theories or divergent policy perspectives,
would be articulated. This would provide the ultimate politically responsible decisionmaker with a complete picture of risks and benefits.2 1 4 The proposal calls for a group of staff scientists from various
disciplines to produce the strongest possible case for the risks entailed
in an environmental release of a biotechnology product. 215 Another
group, composed of economists and experts on commercial applications
of biotechnology, would provide the best case for the potential benefits
of the genetically altered organism.16 After opportunity for public
comment on both, the two reports would go to the decisionmaker,
who would review each of the two reports and determine whether
regulatory actions are warranted.217
The idea of a quasi-adversarial process has some merit. A quasi-adversarial process would protect against suppression or neglect of par-

210.

Rushefsky, The Misuse of Science in Governmental Decisionmaking, SCI.,

TECH.,

AND HUMAN VALUES 47, 48-51 (Summer 1984). See also Harlow, supra note 23, at 569 n.83.
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214.
215.
216.
217.

See Fogleman, supra note 105, at 185-89.
See Ruckleshaus, supra note 203, at 24-25.
See Harlow, supra note 23, at 571.
Id.
Id. at 571-72.
Id.
Id.
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ticular perspectives and data not readily embraced by a single group
of reviewers. Two groups are more likely than a single group to
generate imaginative alternatives to conflicting scenarios. Two groups
also are more likely to ensure genuine balance between conflicting
points of view than a single group that might favor its preference
when drafting a purported compromise.
The composition of the two groups described in the proposal above,
however, should be modified. Having one group consist completely of
scientists charged with emphasizing the risks and another group composed entirely of economists to tout the benefits reflects several faulty
premises. To begin with, the lines of conflict are not drawn between
scientists lamenting the risks of environmental release and economists
calculating the benefits. The lines of dispute are currently among
scientists themselves, generally between microbiologists and systems
ecologists.218

Moreover, economists should not limit their review to the potential
benefits of release biotechnology. Risks of harm also have economic
projections, which regulators often overlook when only benefits are
calculated in economic terms. 219 To alleviate this imbalance, both the
risk-reporting and the benefit-reporting groups therefore should consist of both scientists and economists.
Finally, all valid considerations in risk versus benefit analysis are
not reducible to economic terms. The predisposition of risk-benefit
analysis toward purely economic considerations is a major reason for
the deplorable history of environmental exploitation in industrial nations. 10 Both quasi-advocacy groups should also reflect disciplines that
consider non-economic values.221

218. See Framework, supra note 25, at 74. Elliot Norse, representing the professional
organization of ecologists attributed the disagreement between microbiologists and ecologists to

the differences in the settings and subjects of their respective types of biological research, stating:
Molecular biologists explore the mysteries of the invisible world within cells in
clean orderly laboratories. We explore the mysteries of nature in fields, forest,
and wetlands. Rather than working with the smallest, most isolated components

of life in controlled situations, we examine the interactions of nature in the fascinating, messy, enormously more complex world outside . . . . [T]he scientists who
have so far dominated the discussion of biotechnology don't understand the interaction of living things in their environments well enough to justify their assertions
that the risks are insignificant.
Id.
219.

See Harlow, supra note 23, at 558-59.

220. Id.
221.

Id. at 562-63.
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Need for New Legislation

Regulation of the environmental release of genetically engineered
organisms requires new legislation, as well as reorganization of existing administrative procedures. The statutes under which the EPA and
the USDA currently operate were not designed to regulate release
biotechnology.- The new legislation should give the EPA sole authority to regulate all environmental release of genetically engineered
organisms.
The EPA is the only agency whose mission clearly charges it with
protecting the environnlent . The USDA's mission to promote as well
as regulate agriculture is not well suited to protection of the environment. For instance, the USDA faces a conflict of interest in situations
where the promotion of agriculture differs from what is best for the
environment.2 The USDA should retain the authority to regulate
issues dealing with the effect of genetically altered organisms on agriculture, but not the additional authority to decide whether the same
product should be regulated as a threat to the non-agricultural environment. In the vaccination of pigs using genetically altered pseudorabies vaccine, for example, the legislative authority should be structured so that the USDA would decide whether the vaccine is safe and
effective for the pigs, but not whether the shedding of the genetically
altered microorganism through the pigs' body fluids poses harm to
the environment.
The problem of delay caused by dual agency review could be
minimized by conducting simultaneous agency reviews. If the USDA
declares a product safe for agriculture but the EPA concludes the
same product is unsafe for the environment, a higher authority could
intervene. The higher authority would then conduct a risk-benefit and
risk management analysis. In such a case, each agency's advocacy for
its primary constituency would be similar in effect to the intra-agency
quasi-adversarial process described above. Such decisions might be
resolved at the Presidential Cabinet level.
The new biotechnology legislation should place the burden of proof
for safety on the sponsor of the proposed product. Currently under
TSCA, a product is presumed safe unless the EPA can show otherwise.- This burden should be reversed. The legislation should provide
a rebuttable presumption that a product is are not safe until the

222.
223.
224.
225.

See
See
See
See

Fogleman, supra note 105, at 235.
Biotechnology Report, supra note 103, at 94.
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manufacturer has demonstrated its safety. This shift in the burden of
proof has several benefits. First, it weights close decisions in favor
of the environment. It also prevents proceeding without suitable data
necessary for an informed risk assessment. Under the current presumption, uncertainty favors the production of potentially harmful
products. Reversal of the presumption places the burden on the manufacturer and resolves uncertainty in favor of environmental protection.
Placing the burden of proof on the Food and Drug Administration
to prove harm in the context of food additives and drugs instead of
on the manufacturer to prove safety is unthinkable. Yet, we currently
put such a burden on the EPA and the USDA. The environment is
entitled to receive the same structural protection as human consumers
of food and drugs. Moreover, protection of the environment is related
integrally to protection of humans. For example, manufacturers' use
of hydrofluorocarbons in aerosols and cooling systems causes destruction of the ozone layer, resulting in serious harm to humans and the
entire environment. Shifting the burden of proof for safety to the
proponent of the product is the best and fairest way of generating
the data base necessary for accurate risk assessment and standardized,
efficient review. In this way, the party who stands to benefit most
from the implementation of the technology also incurs the corollary
responsibility of demonstrating its safety.
The new legislation should cover the gaps and inadequacies of the
current statutory authority and regulatory process. It should grant
the EPA more than the mere notification, listing, and reporting authority currently available under TSCA.226 The EPA should have the same
permitting authority for nonpesticide environmental releases of genetically engineered organisms as it has for microbial pesticides under
FIFRA.m The EPA also should be given a longer period of time to
assess the risks of genetically engineered products. The ninety-day
statutory periodm allowed by TSCA may be adequate to assess risks
for chemical pesticides, where data exists and environmental interactions are simpler. Yet, the greater uncertainty and complexity of
living, evolving, reproducing organisms in the environment requires
greater time for assessment.2 The EPA should be given a minimum
of one year to verify and evaluate the data submitted by sponsors.2 30

226. Id.
227. See 40 C.F.R. § 162 (1989).
228. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1) (1982).
229. See Harlow, supra note 23, at 565.
230. Id. at 570.
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The legislation also should provide flexibility, however, either to shorten or lengthen this period where appropriate. If adequate research
and experience with a particular type of organism in a specific environment consistently demonstrates safety, then an abbreviated, standardized review process could reduce the time needed for approval.-, Conversely, if further testing becomes necessary to assess risk, the oneyear period could be lengthened.
New legislation should eliminate the present research and development exemptions under TSCA. 22 The legislation also should abolish
the small-scale testing exemption under FIFRA.- NIH regulation of
research in contained laboratory facilities has proven adequate to prevent accidental release. The NIH Guidelines, however, are inadequate
to regulate intentional environmental release.- A genetically engineered organism released into the environment presents the same
risks whether the scientist's purpose is pure research or commercial
application.
Small-scale field testing may allow for adequate containment of
experimental chemical substances. Invisible, genetically engineered
microbes capable of reproducing themselves and developing resistance
to antibiotic controls, however, cannot be contained simply by restricting the area to a smal] scale. Therefore, all research requiring field
testing in the open environment must be subject to the same careful
review and risk assessment as environmental releases for commercial
purposes.
New legislation also should authorize the EPA to require built-in
safety features in genetically engineered organisms where feasible.
For example, using bacteria from tropical zones that cannot survive
the cold weather in temperate climates- would allow use of the altered

231. Id. at 575.
232. 40 C.F.R. § 720.36 (1989) (exemption for small quantities used in research).
233. 40 C.F.R. § 172.3 (1989). Small-scale field testing is exempt when its only purpose is
to determine the proposed pesticide's toxicity or value as a pesticide. In addition, the researcher
must not expect to receive any benefit from its use and the test must be performed on less
than 10 acres of land or less than one surface acre of water. Id.
234. See Biotechnology Report, supra note 103, at 7. The primary inadequacies of NIH-RAC
Guidelines are as follows:
1) They are mandatory only for federally funded research; commercial research,
production and distribution by private entities would not be regulated.
2) They do not apply to methods of genetic engineering other than R-DNA, for
example R-RNA (ribonucleic acid), cell fusion, etc.

Id.
235. See Pimentel, supra note 16, at 120. Pimentel notes that of the tropical insects introduced into the United Kingdom almost 90% did not survive. He also suggests other means for
controlling environmentally released organisms, such as designing them to be dependent on
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bacteria as a microbial pesticide during the crop growing season in
the Midwest. After the growing season, however, the microbe could
not survive the winter, thus limiting its ability to establish a permanent
environmental niche. The new legislation should require the EPA to
consider alternative methods in the risk assessment process. When
conventional methods can achieve the same end result without genetic
engineering, no justification exists for taking the additional risks posed
by genetic alteration.2
,The new legislation also must address the problem of interagency
coordination, cooperation, and dispute resolution. The BSCC was established to address these issues, and it responded with the Coordinated Framework. The BSCC, however, merely provides a forum for
information sharing and voluntary coordination among the various regulatory agencies.237It does not possess the statutory authority to set
policy or to impose resolutions of interagency conflicts, common definitions of terms, or jurisdictional disputes.m
Some commentators suggest regulations that would provide the
BSCC with authority to impose binding policies and regulations on
the member agencies.23 But this suggestion is probably unworkable
for two reasons. Even a proponent of this idea concedes: "An organization composed totally of representatives from numerous agencies,
each with no one having a clear leadership role is not likely to reach
agreement on important issues."o In addition, the BSCC's value as
an information-sharing and coordinating group would be undermined
by the internal struggles over agency regulatory power.
Some official body must be charged with the authority and responsibility to set overall policy, to define consistently key terms, and to
resolve interagency conflict. Perhaps the Presidential Cabinet provides
the best existing authoritative body for this function. Under the legislation proposed herein, giving the EPA the lead role in regulating the
environmental impacts of biotechnology would require cabinet-level
clout to carry out its responsibility.

some essential nutrient not available in the natural environment but distributed with the release
of the organism so that its spread and survival could be controlled. Id.
236. See Fowler, Lachovics, Mooney & Shand, Biopolicy: Ideas for Public Policy and
Legislation on Biotechnology, 1-2 DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 225 (1988).
237. See Fogleman, supra note 105, at 230-31.
238. Id. at 232.
239. See Hoffman, supra note 20, at 546.
240. Id.
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CONCLUSION

The potential benefits of genetically engineered organisms to agriculture and the environment justify their use, provided the risks of
harm receive careful and adequate consideration. Since scientific uncertainty and dispute between microbiologists and ecologists make risk
assessment inherently trans-scientific, regulatory procedures must be
altered to recognize the political and public policy aspects of risk
assessment. Quasi-adversarial procedures should be implemented to
ensure balanced information and to compensate for hidden biases in
risk assessment methods.
The confusion, duplication, and regulatory gaps in the Coordinated
Framework reflect the flaws inherent in regulating invisible, rapidly
replicating and evolving micro-organisms through EPA and USDA
statutes designed to regulate chemicals, plants, and animals. Congress
should enact a new statute designed specifically to address the unique
environmental risks posed by the release of. genetically altered organisms into the environment. This legislation should reflect the views
of both systems ecologists and microbiologists. Thus far, the views of
microbiologists have dominated the EPA and USDA policies and regulations.
New legislation also should designate the EPA as the lead agency
to oversee regulation of environmental risks entailed in biotechnological development. Only the EPA has a clear mandate to protect the
environment. The USDA's dual role as regulator and promoter of
agriculture creates a vulnerability to conflicts of interest where protection of the environment is concerned.
The new legislation also should shift the burden of proof for environmental safety to the applicant seeking implementation of environmental release. This shift will help to generate adequate information for
risk assessment. Shifting the burden of proof away from the agency
places a structural presumption in favor of environmental protection.
Such a presumption is essential to human and ecological well-being.
William Allen
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